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Abstract 
 
This survey summarizes and analyzes theoretical, empirical and experimental research that 
addresses limit order book transparency in securities markets. We conclude that changes in 
market design that alter transparency have far reaching but complex impacts on market quality, 
market efficiency and price discovery. We suggest that future research into the impact of 
transparency choices in market design should take a more holistic approach in which several 
aspects of market quality are considered, results are verified across different market segments 
impacted unequally, and, ideally, matching securities in other markets are used as controls. We 
consider what policy recommendations can be made based on current evidence and suggest what 
more research needs to be done. 
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Despite the significant attention that limit order book transparency has received in the literature 
on securities market design, the effects of transparency on market quality are still poorly 
understood. More transparency is generally considered to be related to greater fairness, more 
efficient information acquisition and better governance, thus at first glance a benefit to all market 
participants. The marginal investor and his or her broker would accordingly be expected to prefer 
a transparent limit order book.1 Below the surface the impact of limit order book [LOB] 
transparency is more complicated, for example large fund managers 2 are often concerned that 
other market participants may front-run, quote match or piggy back 3 their orders in a fully 
transparent environment. Hence this category of large buy side investors and their brokers 
support a less transparent order book design. This article aims to review relevant theoretical, 
empirical and experimental studies with focus on limit order book transparency and suggests 
directions for future research. 
“Microstructure models generally originate from the fact that markets can differ in a 
number of aspects including the typology of participants, their attitude towards risks, the 
existence of fixed entry costs, the organizational structure of trades and the degree of 
transparency” (Jong and Rindi (2009)). At the heart of microstructure research, transparency is 
                                                 
1 Australian broker-dealers often complain about how hard it is to find counterparties to trades in the anonymous 
trading environment after broker IDs were hidden in November, 2005, when they compare to the preceding period 
when brokers showing their interest in the orderbook could be contacted to negotiate trades. 
2 The authors discussed with traders at one of the largest pension fund managers in Australia shortly after the move 
to an anonymous orderbook in 2005 and they emphasized how much easier it is for them to execute large trades as 
they do not have to be concerned about their orders being exposed in the market. 
3 Front running is when a participant enters an order in front of another order in the same direction, e.g. when a 
broker-dealer trades ahead of large client orders either on behalf of other customers or themselves, quote matching is 
when a participant enters and order at the same price as another order in the same direction, piggy backing is when a 
participant enters and order at a price level close to another large order to benefit from its impact on liquidity. 
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defined as “the ability of market participants to observe information about the trading process” 
(O'Hara (1995)). The concept can be also partitioned into pre-trade and post-trade transparency. 
Pre-trade transparency refers to the current quoted prices and quantities, market depths, and/or to 
the market participants’ identities, and may be directed to all the agents present in the market or 
to a subset (i.e. brokers/dealers). Post-trade transparency refers to the public and timely 
disclosure of the size and direction of the executed orders and the identity of the traders. There 
are different nuances of both pre-trade and post-trade transparency depending on the structure of 
the exchange and the type of information provided, for example how widely the identities of 
market participants is disseminated and how many price levels of the limit order book are visible. 
The opposite to a transparent LOB is often called opaque or anonymous. 
The LOB is the collection of unexecuted orders, normally relatively small orders submitted 
by numerous and diverse traders. The unique feature of the book is that the trader who places a 
limit order does not know the total size of the incoming order that will cause his own order to 
execute. A large marketable order will ‘walk through the book’, with the first quantity executing 
at the most favorable price and successive portions on less favorable terms (Hasbrouck (2007)). 
If the limit order book is transparent it is easier for a trader to estimate what the likely execution 
outcome will be, as the available limit orders are visible. This article focuses on the impact of 
displaying or not displaying broker identification, in the following ID transparency, and the 
impact of changing the number of levels of the LOB that are displayed, in the following LOB 
transparency. We investigate what the literature has uncovered about how these market 
transparency choices impact market efficiency and market quality, indicated by among others 
transaction costs, liquidity and price discovery. While we discuss the distinction between pre-
trade and post-trade transparency, this is not the main focus of this survey. 
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Although there have been a large number of studies on the effect of disclosure of 
participants’ identities, the studies assume one state of the market, either ‘Anonymous’ or 
‘Transparent’, while they largely ignore that the information often is only available to certain 
participants, typically the broker and dealers that are exchange members. The unequal access of 
market participants to the traders’ identities and other information in the LOB might notably 
influence the market efficiency and trading volume, as well as other aspects of market quality. 
Thus, there is an urgent need for better understanding of how different degrees of disclosure of 
LOB information, including broker identities, affect market quality. In addition, there are also 
markets, such as the Toronto Stock Exchange, that allow traders to decide themselves if the 
broker identity is to be disclosed or not, which creates a market where the broker identity is 
public for some orders and hidden for others. Comerton-Forde and Tang (2007) report that most 
market participants choose to keep the broker ID for their orders public when there is a choice. 
They find that anonymous orders are used more frequently by proprietary traders than by their 
clients, their overall use is low and there is no evidence that they are commonly used to conceal 
front running.  
An efficient market is a public good that benefits all individuals and organizations in the 
market. Informational efficiency discussed here is not to be confused with allocational or Pareto 
efficiency, as informational efficiency refers to the extent that share prices reflect the information 
available to investors. An informationally efficient market plays a crucial role for all market 
parties, given that in such a market, a share price reflects all that is known in relation to the 
prospects of the company and the collective view of the market as to what it is worth. 
Astonishingly, given the prominence of market efficiency in market policy initiatives, there has 
been a policy gap due to a failure to fully address relevant issues, such as the gains from trade 
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and market efficiency within a framework of utility maximizing agents, hence making the 
assumption that market participants trade to maximize their utility. 
There is still little theoretical or empirical consensus in the literature about the effect of 
transparency on traditional market quality metrics, such as quoted and effective spreads, 
volatility, depth and volume, likely due to that current empirical research typically ignores the 
endogeneity in these variables. Many empirical studies investigating the impact of 
transparency/opacity alterations begins by pointing out that the change altered a whole variety of 
metrics such as volume, volatility, effective and realized spread (for example Foucault, Moinas 
and Theissen (2007); Comerton-Forde, Frino and Mollica (2005); Comerton-Forde and Tang 
(2009)). Empirical studies in market microstructure almost exclusively use one of these metrics 
as a dependent variable and treat the remaining market quality metrics as exogenous control 
variables. The apparent endogeneity raises a question about the eligibility of some of the control 
variables in the models that have been applied to assess the impact of transparency. One notable 
exception is Eom, Ok and Park (2007), who examine the impact of expansions of the best bid 
and ask levels revealed to the public controlling for variable endogeneity. Thus, there is a need 
for a thorough discussion on how to best measure market quality and for empirical research to 
select appropriate exogenous variables to explain market quality changes. 
This survey begins by reviewing theoretical work that hypothesizes on the market quality 
effects of a publicly transparent limit order book and transparent or anonymous broker identities; 
we then review empirical studies that assess the impact of transparency on market quality 
proxies. We finally discuss experimental studies on the topic. The article finishes with a 
summary of the conclusions and suggests directions for future research. 
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2. Transparency of Broker Identification 
2.1. Theoretical Review ID Transparency 
Madhavan (1996) compares markets with different levels of transparency (the model applies to 
both ID and LOB transparency) based on a game-theoretic model. He comes to the conclusion 
that transparency may induce a form of market failure because traders are unwilling to reveal 
their information to others and are less willing to share risk by trading. However, this applies 
only to linear equilibria, and a linear equilibrium may not exist if the market is too transparent. 
He shows that in a transparent mechanism, price volatility might be lower if the market is 
sufficiently competitive, or higher if markets are sufficiently thin where the effects of the 
reduction in the perceived level of noise trading are the greatest. Thus, transparency has a mixed 
effect on security prices. He concludes that greater transparency may, in less liquid markets, 
induce lower liquidity and higher implicit transaction costs.  
Rindi (2008) constructs a model based on Madhavan (1996), but she clarifies the effect of 
transparent trader or broker identities on adverse selection costs by assuming that liquidity 
providers are risk averse; in her model all market participants, including both informed and 
uninformed, can simultaneously submit limit orders and can enter and leave the market at their 
convenience. Rindi (2008) emphasizes the assumption that market participants are endogenous. 
Under full transparency, uninformed traders recognize liquidity traders and so are ready to offer 
liquidity. Thus, ID transparency increases liquidity. However, when information acquisition is 
endogenous, ID transparency reduces the incentive to buy costly information and so reduces the 
number of informed traders. It follows that the initial result on the effect of pre-trade ID 
transparency on liquidity in Rindi’s model is reversed and ID transparency ultimately lowers the 
number of informed agents who enter the market and thus reduces liquidity. Green, Hollifield 
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and Schürhoff (2007) developed a simple theoretical model that distinguishes three components 
of the dealer’s gains on a trade: the commission for facilitating the trade, a zero-mean forecast 
error and a measure of the dealer’s market power. They find that increased ID transparency 
reduces cross-subsidization from smaller traders in favor of larger traders. The greater ID 
transparency leads to a reduction in costs by encouraging smaller traders to submit larger orders, 
and thus increases liquidity. Timely reporting of price information is found to reduce bargaining 
power for dealers in their trading with small traders. 
In summary one theoretical model indicates that ID transparency may have both positive 
and negative effects on market quality depending of liquidity, one model indicates negative 
effects in the limit order book while another model indicates positive effects in a dealer market. 
2.2 Empirical Review ID Transparency 
The theoretical literature is valuable in providing insights into the expected effects of market 
design choices. However, the strategies applied by market participants in markets of different 
design are often too complicated to be modeled and assumptions and simplifications in 
theoretical models may not apply to real markets. A significant number of empirical studies have 
been implemented in different stock exchanges. The first category of studies investigate the 
impact on bid-ask spreads of the removal of pre-trade ID transparency, the second category looks 
how delayed reporting of trades, hence post-trade removal of ID transparency affect spread. 
Finally a few studies look at the impact of the removal of ID transparency on trading volume and 
market efficiency.  
2.2.1 Evidence against ID Transparency 
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Simaan, Weaver and Whitcomb (2003) examine the impact of pre-trade transparency on the 
quotation behavior of NASDAQ market makers. Their findings support Rindi (2008) assertion 
that allowing anonymous quotes could improve price competition and narrow spreads further 
because market makers would have a much higher propensity to actively narrow the spread than 
they do when quoting directly in the NASDAQ quote montage. 
Foucault, et al. (2007) study the pre- and post-periods surrounding April 23, 2001, when 
the LOB for stocks listed on Euronext Paris was made anonymous. They propose a theoretical 
model where informed bidders exploit the transparent market by bidding as if the cost of 
liquidity provision was large, when in fact it is small. This strategy is less effective when traders 
cannot distinguish between informative and uninformative limit orders. Hence informed bidders 
act more competitively in an anonymous market where average quoted spreads and volatility 
decline significantly. However, the 40 stocks they examine in this paper were the only ones 
subject to the change in pre-trade transparency (unlike other Paris stocks). It would be interesting 
to see what happens to the overall market, something that is partly addressed in Majois (2007). 
Comerton-Forde, et al. (2005) investigate Euronext Paris, the Tokyo Stock Exchange and 
the Korean Exchange [KRX]. While their findings are consistent with Foucault, et al. (2007) in 
case of Euronext Paris, they find a decrease in relative bid-ask spreads and effective spreads at 
Euronext Paris, little change at the TSE and the reverse effect at the KRX. Comerton-Forde and 
Tang (2009) examine the effects of the removal of broker identifiers from the central LOB of the 
ASX. They find that spreads and order aggressiveness decline, and order-book depth increases, 
with the introduction of anonymous trading. Other studies of the Australian case include Lepone 
and Mistry (2011)  who find that the removal of broker identifiers does not provide consistent 
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evidence of any changes in the short-term information content of large dollar volume orders. 
This suggests that disclosed orders provide more information to the market than do broker 
identifiers. 
Maslov and Mills (2001) find that corporations with larger market capitalization and higher 
trading frequency tend to narrow down the price gaps between their successive bid and ask on 
average, and that the average size of a limit order decreases with the level of the order book. 
Menkhoff, Osler and Schmeling (2010) conduct an empirical investigation of the difference 
between informed and uninformed traders’ aggressiveness in a pure limit-order market. They 
find that informed traders are more sensitive and respond more rapidly to changing market 
conditions than the uninformed, which boosts the dominance of the informed over limit-order 
submissions. To this we suggest that if the brokers’ IDs are public, the impact of such asymmetry 
in order flow may be less severe as participants can infer the expected impact of the orders 
causing asymmetry when they know the origin of the order. 
Gemmill (1996) examines the impact of reducing market transparency by postponing the 
time of price disclosure for block trades on liquidity in the London Stock Exchange, and finds 
negative effects. The analysis uses standard event-study methodology in three different 
revelation regimes: immediate, 90 minutes and 24 hours. They find that the size of spreads is 
affected by market volatility rather than speed of publication. Furthermore, they do not document 
any significant effect of timely publication on speed of adjustment, smoothing or ultimate price 
level. Board and Sutcliffe (2000) strengthen Gemmill (1996) conclusion by implementing an 
empirical study on the same stock exchange but in a different time period. They investigate the 
effect of the change in trade publication rules on January 1, 1996 that reduced the proportion of 
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major traders delaying publication. They find that this more transparent regime leads to no 
evident negative change in market quality. With greater transparency, information asymmetries 
are reduced, and Board and Sutcliffe (2000) conclude that “neither the volume nor the traded 
bid-ask spread has been adversely affected”. 
2.2.2 Evidence in favor or ID transparency 
Porter and Weaver (1998) study delayed post-trade reporting on the NASDAQ National Market 
System, and reach the opposite conclusion to the London Stock Exchange research. They 
discover a substantial number of out-of-sequence trades following delayed post-trade reporting 
using the 90-second rule in the NASDAQ. They argue that this rule could create an environment 
where some traders use late trade reporting to delay the release of strategic information, which 
would impede the price discovery process and increase transaction costs. 
A limitation of existing empirical literature is the lack of study of the role of broker 
identities on the informational content of trades and market efficiency. A recent study of Frino, 
Johnstone and Zheng (2010) examines the price and market impact of consecutive buyer/seller-
initiated trades by the same brokers. This paper finds that the identity of brokers contains 
information, and concludes that disclosure of the broker identification is likely to result in more 
efficient markets. 
Lepone, Segara and Wong (2012) who investigate the lead up to takeover announcements 
and find that informed traders are less easily detected when broker IDs are concealed, an 
indication that transparent broker IDs improve market efficiency in this context. 
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Linnainmaa and Saar (2012) use the detailed investor level data from Finland to show that 
there is valuable information contained in the broker identity, and that traders make use of this 
information to infer which brokers are more likely to represent informed traders. The market has 
since followed the suite of other limit order-driven exchanges and ceased displaying broker IDs 
pre-trade, but still reveals this information post-trade except for the most liquid companies. 
Pham, Swan and Westerholm (2013) investigate the move to anonymous broker IDs on the 
ASX in November 2005, and find that traded volume in the limit order book falls relative to the 
traded volume off market when variables with endogenous effects on volume are replaced by 
instrumental variables. They also show that prices follow a random walk in the transparent 
environment and that the serial correlation in prices increase in the opaque environment. Pham, 
et al. (2013) demonstrate that the effect on spreads is minimal and that the change in ID 
transparency has a more significant effect on other metrics for market quality. 
2.2.3. Challenges to these empirical findings and summary of analysis 
Current empirical research into ID transparency can be challenged on many points, but it has to 
be emphasized that researchers only have a limit number of natural experiments to work with 
and often do the best they can with what they have. We already pointed out that all of these 
studies are potentially affected by endogeneity in the controls that are utilized. Another caveat of 
the empirical research is that “they compare anonymous automated market structures with 
separate non-anonymous market structures where liquidity suppliers can selectively participate 
after observing the identities of other participants” (Tang (2008)). Consequently, these studies 
constitute joint tests of the effects of both market structure and anonymous trading. 
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In addition to the above, most studies investigate one-off transparency events in the unique 
markets which may limit general application of their results. Using the first major market to 
make broker IDs anonymous, Euronext, as an example for our argument, the outcomes of 
Foucault, et al. (2007) are limited to CAC-40 stocks, which are subject to pre-trade transparency 
changes, and full post-trade opacity. The transparency of LOB and broker IDs after trading these 
very large stocks theoretically makes a significant difference in market quality, while the impact 
may be different in the other market segments. Finally, the results in the literature regarding 
Euronext may also be driven by a global liquidity trend during the investigated period, as shown 
in Majois (2007), who investigates the effect of anonymity on spreads using a large sample of 
Euronext Paris stocks, and compares the results to trends in spreads on the NYSE during the 
same period.  
Finally since most events studied are a change from ID transparency to ID opacity, often in 
combination with an increase in LOB transparency, it is very likely that what is picked up is a 
secular trend of increased liquidity over time, driven by among other things increased automation 
of the trading process and a continuous increase in execution speed. Future research needs to 
either include an equal number of events that increase and decrease transparency or sufficiently 
deal with the issue of trending changes in the investigated variables. 
In summary empirical studies of the effect of ID transparency are divided. The reason is 
that these studies are investigating different aspects of market quality. In most studies bid-ask 
spreads decrease when broker IDs are hidden, but some studies find decreased trading volume in 
the centralized LOB in favour of off-market and alternative trading platforms and decreases in 
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market efficiency. This is why it is important to analyze these incremental results across studies 
with the purpose of obtaining some consensus on the effect of ID transparency. 
3 Transparency of the Limit Order Book 
3.1 Theoretical Review LOB Transparency 
Pagano and Roell (1996) propose a model to study the effect of different degrees of order flow 
visibility on liquidity in an anonymous environment. Thus, market makers are assumed to be 
able to infer information by observing order flows only. Pagano and Roell (1996) set their bid-
ask spread so as to protect themselves against an adverse selection problem potentially generated 
by insiders rather than to cover their inventory holding costs, as in Biais (1993). They prove that 
even if prices are less favorable over some range of order sizes, the implicit bid-ask spread of 
noise traders will be tighter in a more transparent auction market, as the more information traders 
learn about the order flow, the better they can protect themselves against losses to insiders. Biais 
(1993) models the bidding strategies of risk-averse agents who are market makers or limit order 
traders in a centralized market, and dealers in fragmented markets, competing for one market 
order. Centralized markets are regarded as more transparent mechanisms, as market makers or 
limit order traders can observe the quotes of their competitors; meanwhile, dealers can only 
assess the positions of their competitors in fragmented markets. With the assumption of 
asymmetric information between dealers and liquidity traders, he shows that the expected spread 
is equal in both markets with different market structures. 
Two later studies, following a model of market making with inventories based on Biais 
(1993), arrived at diametrically opposite conclusions. Slightly modifying the market model with 
risk-averse dealer assumption, Frutos and Manzano (2002) show that “greater transparency may 
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have detrimental effects on liquidity” because of less competition among risk-averse dealers for 
the order flows, and thus higher spread. In contrast to Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995), Frutos and 
Manzano (2002), and Yin (2005) introduce a tiny searching cost and find that the expected bid-
ask spread in a fragmented market is greater than in a centralized market, which is more 
transparent. In a fragmented market, which is less transparent, the public investors can acquire 
transaction information by visiting dealers and obtaining quotes from them. Although dealers 
pass their own quotes to their clients at no explicit cost, liquidity traders still incur some implicit 
cost, for example, time spent on connecting with dealers, other direct costs or opportunity costs, 
in searching for favorable prices. The theoretical finding of Baruch (2005) is in line with Yin 
(2005). Baruch (2005) models a specialist’s single price auction market, similar to the auction 
that the NYSE uses, to open the trading day under two different market mechanisms, in which 
the LOB is open in the first and closed in the other. He states that when the book is open, the 
transitory component is lower, due to the increase in competition for liquidity provision. Thus, 
the informed trader trades more aggressively, releasing more of his private information. 
However, the decrease in the transitory component of the spread offsets the increase in the 
adverse selection component, so that overall trading costs are lower and prices are more 
informative in the open-book environment. As a result, increased transparency can improve 
liquidity and informational efficiency of stocks markets. 
A number of theoretical studies on post-trade transparency have been performed. 
Chowdhry and Nanda (1991), extending Kyle (1985) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) models, 
study a situation where a security trades at multiple markets simultaneously, and informed 
traders have several venues to exploit their private information. They consider two scenarios: one 
assumes that the private information possessed by the informed trader is short lived; the other 
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assumes that the insider’s information is long lived and incorporated into price after each round 
of trading. For the former, they argue that small liquidity traders will favor the market where 
liquidity traders, who are unable to move between markets, contribute most to the trading 
volume, as their expected trading costs are minimized. The informed and large liquidity traders 
are also attracted by this market. Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) extend Admati and Pfleiderer 
(1988) finding that trading patterns are sensitive to the proportion of market traders who do not 
have the flexibility to trade in their expected market locations. In the latter scenario, they find 
that the informed traders would not prefer a location where market makers can disclose the price 
information to public, as a timely release of price information may deteriorate the expected gains 
of informed traders in other market locations as well. Their results imply that competing market 
makers in a multiple market setting will voluntarily make price information public to deter 
informed trading at their location due to reduced adverse selection; eventually, this market will 
attract the largest proportion of large liquidity as well as informed trading. 
This view is advocated by Madhavan (1995), who develops Glosten and Milgrom (1985) 
model of a dealer market with three types of traders, including noise traders, larger liquidity 
traders and informed traders, in which successive traders’ arrivals are not independent. He 
analyses two transparent mechanisms: in the first system, dealers have homogenous information 
where trade disclosure in mandatory and individual trades may be executed in different market 
centers. In another system, they consider that trader disclosure is voluntary for dealers; thus 
dealers have heterogeneous beliefs, and prices may differ across market centers at a given point 
in time. In the first scenario, they found that spread narrows over the day where information is 
compulsorily disclosed, because market makers learn from order flow, thereby facilitating price 
discovery. In a fragmented market where disclosure of trading information is optional, large 
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liquidity traders and informed traders can obtain better trades through dynamic strategies, 
creating a demand for non-transparent trading systems. Non-disclosing dealers may benefit from 
their private information on past trades by selectively participating in future trading because of 
less price competition. Yet these gains come at the expense of noise traders. Madhavan (1995) 
concludes that bid-ask spreads become narrower in a transparent market, and the opposite is 
observed in an opaque market. This research also implies that a market without post-trade 
disclosure results in higher price volatility and inefficient prices. 
In contrast to previous advocators for transparency, Naik, Neuberger and Viswanathan 
(1999) state that the effects of release of post-trade information are ambiguous. Their paper 
analyses a two-stage model of trading in a dealership market, where a public investor trades with 
an arbitrarily chosen market maker in the first stage, and the market makers offset their position 
by trading with other market makers. They find that greater transparency reduces adverse 
selection and hence enhances the sharing of quantity risk. However, “disclosure reduces the 
ability of the market to offer insurance against price revision risk to investors who wish to hedge 
their endowment shocks”, and worsens price revision risk sharing. In contrast, “a lack of trade 
disclosure worsens quantity risk sharing but improves price revision risk sharing”, which leads to 
an ambiguous welfare comparison. The limitation of this model is that the number of market 
makers is assumed to be exogenous, and the public investor acquires information exogenously. If 
public investors have to expend effort to collect information, different disclosure regimes would 
stimulate different incentives for gathering information. 
3.2 Empirical Review LOB Transparency 
3.2.1 Evidence in favor of LOB Transparency 
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The informative value of revealing deeper degrees of LOB is reinforced in Cao, Hansch and 
Wang (2009). Using order-book information from the ASX, they find that the LOB allows more 
accurate estimations of a security’s value than simply the best bid and offer, and that the order 
book beyond the best bid and offer contributes approximately 22 per cent to price discovery. 
Essentially, the following empirical studies show that making different levels of the LOB 
transparent can affect market quality in distinctive ways. 
Boehmer, Saar and Yu (2005) support the theoretical outcome of Baruch (2005) above, and 
find that increased transparency can improve the liquidity and informational efficiency of stock 
markets. Boehmer, et al. (2005) investigate how pre-trade transparency affects investor trading 
strategies, specialist behavior, market quality and the informational efficiency of prices. This is 
an empirical study following the introduction of NYSE’s Open Book service with charge, which 
shows the aggregate limit-order volume available in the NYSE Display Book system at each 
price point. Using a variance decomposition methodology proposed by Hasbrouck (1993), 
Boehmer, et al. (2005) conclude that greater pre-trade transparency is a win-win situation. 
Investors do change their strategies in response to the change in market design: they submit 
smaller limit orders and cancel limit orders in the book more rapidly and more frequently. 
Effective spreads decrease and liquidity improves following the introduction of Open Book. 
However, since they did not observe the complete trading strategy of each investor, they were 
unable to judge whether the trading costs of investors who utilized both market and limit orders 
in the new regime were lower than the trading costs when traders did not have information about 
the book. 
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How transparency affects the behavior of market participants may depend on the degree of 
information asymmetry in the market. Hedvall, Niemeyer and Rosenqvist (1997) conclude that 
the underlying assumption in much of the previous research is a symmetrical market in respect to 
the buy and the sell side; however, the potential asymmetry may lead to aggressive sequences of 
order submissions. They also find that oversized trades seem to induce new provision of liquidity 
from the opposite side of the LOB. Several studies address the asymmetry of orders. Large 
(2007) test the resiliency of order books after significant events (such as big trades), specifically 
in Barclays on the London Stock Exchange. He concludes that the resiliency response is fast 
when it does occur, but it occurs infrequently.  
Hendershott and Jones (2005) show that price discovery declined when the Electronic 
Communications Network (ECN) Island stopped providing order-book information for exchange 
traded funds. Eom, et al. (2007) correct for endogeneity in market quality metrics used as 
dependent or control variables, and find that two Korean increases in the level of order-book 
information displayed to the public have positive effects on market quality. Bessembinder, 
Maxwell and Venkataraman (2006) and Green, et al. (2007) investigate the effect of public 
transaction reporting on trading costs, before and after introduction of the TRACE reporting 
system, using a sample of institutional trades in corporate bonds. They find that when the 
TRACE system started to publish their prices, trade execution costs fell, after controlling for the 
effect of interest rate volatility and trading activity. Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007) 
examine a similar event, but use a record of US over-the-counter secondary trades in corporate 
bonds to examine the impact of price transparency on transaction costs. They utilise an improved 
method and more comprehensive data and find stronger evidence of the benefits of transparency 
to market liquidity. Execution costs are found to be less for bonds with transparent trade prices 
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than for similar opaque bonds, and the costs reduce when bond prices are switched from opaque 
to transparent. 
Bessembinder and Maxwell (2008) and Chung and Chuwonganant (2009) examine 
markets after a transparency altering ‘event’ has taken place: specifically, the introduction of 
TRACE (a program developed by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) which 
allows for the reporting of over-the-counter (OTC) transactions pertaining to eligible fixed-
income securities); and the introduction of the trading platform SuperMontage on NASDAQ, 
respectively. Both the introduction of Trace (Bessembinder and Maxwell (2008)) and the 
introduction of Supermontage (Chung and Chuwonganant (2009)) were found to increase 
transparency and increase market quality. The TRACE was found to narrow the bid-ask spread, 
while the SuperMontage also narrowed effective and quoted spreads and additionally led to 
faster executions and higher fill rates, and lower return volatility 
3.2.2 Evidence in against LOB Transparency 
Other researchers have the opposite viewpoint. Madhavan, Porter and Weaver (2005) compare 
the market performances prior to and after the Toronto Stock Exchange instituted a computerized 
system to disseminate the depth and quotes for the current inside market (as well as the depth 
and limit order prices for up to four levels above and below the current market), and find that the 
increase in transparency reduces liquidity and increases execution costs and volatility.  
Bortoli, Frino, Jarnecic and Johnstone (2006) find a decrease in the best depth when more 
levels of the LOB are displayed at Sydney futures markets. Aitken, Berkman and Mak (2001) 
found two regulation changes on the ASX that forced traders to display more of their orders 
discouraged primary liquidity suppliers, resulted in a fall in trading volume. The regulation 
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change increased transparency but led to deterioration in market quality in terms of trading 
volume. Changes in the bid-ask spread were found to not be statistically significant. 
3.2.3. Summary of Analysis 
Several studies prove that the LOB contains valuable information for other market participants 
including market makers and specialists without directly addressing changes in LOB 
transparency. Jiang, McInish and Upson (2009) examine trading halts and their effects on 
informationally related stocks in the limit order book. They conclude that when stocks are 
informationally related, trading halts induce higher trade-based liquidity and lower quote-based 
liquidity. Fong and Liu (2010) document the regularity of limit order revisions and cancellations 
and examine their determinants. Harris and Panchapagesan (2005) investigate whether specialists 
can use limit order book information to predict future price changes. Hence, the dissemination of 
this information needs to be fair, and ideally, in our view, provided to all market participants to 
promote a fair and orderly market. 
The case of LOB transparency is significantly more clear cut than ID Transparency. Both 
theoretical and empirical studies without exception conclude that displaying more rather than 
less information about the individual orders in the LOB is beneficial for market quality 
benefiting the overall welfare of all market participants. Naturally there are a few privileged 
functions such as specialists that benefit for the privileged access to the LOB information that 
will lose their advantage when it is publicly displayed and they may no longer be able to 
contribute to liquidity. Hence some dealership markets may operate more optimally with less 
LOB transparency. 
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3.3 Experimental Review 
Studies also turn to experimental markets that have the benefit that the research environment can 
be simplified and designed to perfectly fit the model to be tested. Flood, Huisman, Koedijk and 
Mahieu (1999) support Yin’s (2005) prediction about higher search costs in opaque markets that 
result in wider opening spreads and lower trading volume. However, Flood, et al. (1999) states 
that “higher search costs also induce more aggressive pricing strategies” resulting in faster price 
discovery in the opaque environments. It is important to mention that this experiment is assumed 
to affect pre-trade transparency only, not revelation of post-trade transparency in both scenarios. 
Thus, the outcomes may reverse when the entire order flow is transparent. 
Bloomfield and O'Hara (1999) build up three different transparency regimes. In a 
transparent setting, both market makers’ quotes and trades are published after each round of 
trading. In a partially transparent setting, quotes are displayed but trades are not. In a fully 
opaque setting, neither trades nor quotes are disclosed. Their findings are consistent with 
Madhavan (1995) and Pagano and Roell (1996), showing trade disclosure significantly improves 
the market efficiency. They also observe wider spreads in more transparent markets, which are 
explained by the market makers’ reduced need to compete for order flow to derive information 
about security value. 
Yamamoto (2011) investigates two artificial markets, each with different levels of 
transparency. He concludes that the level of pre-trade transparency is irrelevant to investors’ 
trading frequency, as trading strategies are decided based on current order imbalances. His 
finding implies that “the strategy constructed by the state of the order book is a key for 
explaining long memories in many actual stock exchanges”. 
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Table 1 provides a summary of the key investigated research articles, where the reader can 
obtain an overview of this area of research. The table also provides more detail of what market 
and market type has been studied as well as details of the investigated event. 
4. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the discussed theoretical and empirical studies together weave a complex but 
distinct pattern which helps us understand how modern securities markets function, and how they 
may be impacted by changes in design that alter the interaction between more and less informed 
market participants and larger and smaller orders. Both ID and LOB transparency of a market 
will have a great impact on the interaction between differently endowed market participants. The 
theoretical studies are evenly distributed between supporting of transparency vs. opacity, often 
predicting that increased transparency promotes higher bid-ask spreads but also more efficient 
price discovery and higher market efficiency.  
The empirical literature shows that ID and LOB transparency increases spreads, while 
increased LOB transparency lowers spreads. Since spreads are endogenous to increased liquidity 
in the form of higher volume and faster price discovery some recent studies point out that 
markets participants may in fact be better off in an ID and LOB transparent market design. There 
are important exceptions to this, e.g., liquidity providers are shown to facilitate more trading 
when they have access to anonymous market venues, hence markets with a strong reliance on 
liquidity providers may need to provide lower degrees of transparency to their participants for 
optimal efficiency. Considering the results of theoretical, empirical and experimental studies and 
taking into account outlined weaknesses in the presented research, it is our view that in the 
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modern limit order book environment that relies on the externality of orderflow provided 
liquidity, higher ID and LOB transparency will generally attract more liquidity.   
Empirical research on the effect of transparency on market efficiency, arguably an 
important aspect of market quality, is limited. Whereas there is theoretical and empirical 
evidence of improvements in price discovery in an open LOB, there is little discussion of the 
impact of revealed broker identities on strong-form price formation. Another area that needs 
attention is how different degrees of ID and LOB transparency affect the up-take of alternative 
off-market trading venues such as ECNs and dark-pools in today’s increasingly fragmented 
market place. 
As directions for future research into the impact of transparency choices in market design, 
we suggest a more holistic approach where several aspects of market quality are considered, 
endongeneity in market quality variables is controlled for, results are verified across different 
market segments impacted unequally, and, ideally, matching securities in other markets are used 
as controls. Investigating several global events simultaneously would be useful, but such a study 
would be difficult to implement with a convincing approach. A better approach may be to move 
away from event studies and focus on changes in investor and order level transaction behavior as 
a result of alternations in LOB transparency.  
While the abovementioned extensions to the research are needed to make more detailed 
policy recommendation the evidence indicates that segments of large liquid stocks would benefit 
from an ID and LOB transparent LOB, while segments of less liquid shares may trade more 
effectively in an opaque order book, provided that trading is supported by liquidity providers. 
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Table 1 Summary Table of Investigated Research Articles and Investigated Markets Including Event Dates 
 
  
Research Article Investigated Markets Type of Market(s) Event Date
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) NYSE Hybrid Theoretical
Aitken, Merkman and Mak (2001) ASX automated-order-driven two regulation changes: 24 October 1994 and 16 October 1996
Baruch (2005) NYSE Hybrid LOB made visible to public 24th January 2002
Bessembinder, Maxwell & Venkataraman NYSE, OTC dealer Market Quote driven/ 'Broker' Regulation Change (TRACE) July 1st 2002
Bessembinder and Maxwell (2008) NYSE, OTC dealer market Quote driven/ 'Broker' Regulation Change (TRACE) July 1st 2002
Biais (1993) Centralised Vs Fragmented Theoretical
Biais, Hillion & Spatt (1995) Paris Bourse (Now called Euronext Paris) automated-order-driven Empirical
Bloomfield & Maureen (1999) Artificial, varying degrees of transparency Quote-Driven Experimental
Board & Sutcliffe (2000) LSE Automated-order-driven 1 Jan 1996 Trade publication rules changed
Boehme, Saar & Yu (2005) NYSE Hybrid Introduction of OpenBook on Jan 24th 2002
Bortoli, Frino, Jarnecic & Johnstone (2006)SFE (now part of ASX) automated-order-driven Jan 2001 Increase in LOB depth
Cao, Hansch & Wang (2009) Forex Market London Electronic order book Empirical
Chowdhry & Nanda (1991) Artificial Theoretical
Chung and Chuwonganant (2009) NASDAQ, Control in NYSE Hybrid October 14th 2002 SuperMontage
Commerton-Forde, Frino & Mollica (2005) Euronext Paris, TSE & KRX automated-order-driven Paris: April 23rd 2001, Tokyo: June 30 2003, Korea: Oct 25 1999
Commerton-Forde & Tang (2009) ASX automated-order-driven 28th November 2005 asx removed display of broker id
Edwards, Harris & Piwowar (2007) NYSE, OTC dealer Market Quote driven/ 'Broker MarTRACE (July 1st 2002)
Eom, Ok and Park (2007) KRX automated-order-driven March 6th 2000, Jan 2nd 2002
Flood, Huisman,Koedijik & Mahieu (1999) Experimental market Experimental
Fong and Liu (2010) ASX automated-order-driven Empirical
Foucault, Moinas & Theissen (2007) Euronext Paris automated-order-driven April 23rd 2001
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Research Article Investigated Markets Type of Market(s) Event Date
Frino, Johnstone & Hui (2010) ASX automated-order-driven Empirical
Frutos & Manzano (2002) Artificial based on Biais (1993) Theoretical
Gemmill (1996) LSE automated-order-driven October 1986,Feb 1989 and Jan 1991
Glosten & Milgrom (1985) Model Based Pure Dealership market Theoretical
Green, Hollifield & Schurhoff (2007) Municipal Bond Market Broker-Dealer market Empirical
Harris and Panchapagesan (2005) NYSE Hybrid Empirical
Hasbrouck (1993) NYSE Hybrid Empirical
Hedvall et al (1997) HeSE automated-order-driven Empirical
Hendershott & Jones (2005) AMEX (now NYSE), NASDAQ Hybrid September 23rd 2002
Jianga, McInish and Upson (2009) NYSE, NASDAQ Hybrid Trading Halts between 2003-2005
Kyle (1985) Model Theoretical
Large (2007) LSE automated-order-driven Resiliency events
Madhavan (1995) Model Based on Glosten & Milgrom (1985)Pure Dealership Market Theoretical
Madhavan (1996) Model based on Kyle (1989) Theoretical
Madhavan, Porter & Weaver (2005) TSX automated-order-driven April 12th 1990
Majois (2007) Euronext Paris automated-order-driven April 23rd 2001
Maslova and Mills (2001) NASDAQ Hybrid Empirical
Menkhoff, Osler and Schmeling (2010) MICEX automated-order-driven Empirical
Naik & Viswanathan (1999) Model Based Theoretical
Pagano & Roell (1996) Model Based Theoretical
Porter & Weaver (1998) NASDAQ Hybrid Empirical
Rindi (2008) Similar model to Focault et al (2006) Quote-Driven Theoretical
Simaan, Weaver & Whitcomb (2003) NASDAQ Hybrid First Phase OHR pilot program Jan 20th 1997
Yamamoto (2011) Artificial markets automated-order-driven Theoretical
Yin (2005) Model, extension of Biais (1993) Theoretical
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